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ABSTRACT
Proponents of electronic rulemaking proposals designed to
enhance ordinary citizens’ involvement in the rulemaking process
have debated with skeptics the question of whether such initiatives will
actually increase citizens’ involvement. In the debate thus far,
however, proponents have largely assumed the desirability of such
involvement, and skeptics have usually not challenged that
assumption. In addition, proponents and skeptics have focused on the
relationship between agencies and individuals, failing to consider the
larger administrative law context—and in particular the role played
by Congress and the courts. This Article considers e-rulemaking in a
broader institutional context and directly addresses the desirability of
the proposed e-rulemaking initiatives. The Article finds that there are
good reasons to believe that e-rulemaking initiatives’ costs outweigh
their benefits, but that it would be premature to settle on that
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conclusion. The Article ultimately advocates modest experimentation
with e-rulemaking, both to allow for further evaluation of erulemaking and to provide additional data about the rulemaking
process more generally.

INTRODUCTION
In the last ten to fifteen years, vast numbers of people have
become familiar with basic techniques for online collaboration—e.g.,
e-mail and files stored on central servers available to multiple users.
And in the last few years people have become increasingly familiar
with tools that allow for even richer collaboration, such as wikis,
communities built on reputational capital, and even multi-player
video games. In light of these developments, academic commentators
and public officials have discussed new, more interactive modes of
collective production of intellectual goods. Thus there has been
extensive discussion of open-source or peer-production models for a
broad range of products, including software, information directories,
data-evaluation, and biomedical research. In the administrative law
context, the proposals have focused more specifically on opening up
the rulemaking process to richer input from individuals, including
changes to the administrative process, not only to encourage such
input but also to make it more meaningful.1 In this Article, I assess the

1. See Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public
Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S 59, 59 (2005) (“Researchers and practitioners are on
the cusp of a new era in rulemaking, one in which the continued application of information
technology has the potential to transform both the conduct and management of
rulemaking . . . .”); Thomas C. Beierle, Digital Deliberation: Engaging the Public Through
Online Policy Dialogues, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL
THROUGH THE INTERNET 155, 155 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) (“Accompanying the last
decade’s enthusiasm for the Internet economy were equally extravagant expectations about
information technologies’ impact on democracy and governance.”); Barbara H. Brandon &
Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil
Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1478 (2002) (“The Internet, properly utilized, can make
policymaking more transparent, and enable Americans outside the Beltway to participate more
effectively in the activities of the federal government.”); Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking:
Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 355 (2004)
[hereinafter Coglianese, E-Rulemaking] (“Electronic rulemaking, or e-rulemaking, offers the
potential to overcome some of the informational challenges associated with developing
regulations.”); Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 I/S 33,
34 (2005) [hereinafter Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation] (“[M]any lawyers and
policymakers look with hope to new information technologies as a way of overcoming
rulemaking’s democracy deficit.”); Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything:
Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the
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significance and desirability of these proposed changes to the
administrative rulemaking process. In so doing, I connect these
questions with larger ones about the role of Congress and the courts,
the desirability of public participation in the rulemaking process, and
the role of experimentation.
The range of ways that information technologies could change
2
the rulemaking process is endless. An agency could receive
automatic feedback—for example, by setting up a system of
electronic sensors to monitor a pollutant and send information back
to the agency. Information technology could help flag foreseeable
problems like conflicts with other rules or statutes, or even conflicts
within rules, via sophisticated software that would search through all
available rules and statutes to identify other provisions with wording
that would seem to cover the subject of a given section of a
regulation. Within the four corners of the rulemaking process itself,
information technologies could make it easier for agencies to give
notice to potentially interested people and allow those people to
access and search the proposed rule, could allow for more interactive
Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 279 (1998) (“The Internet and other modern technological
innovations can expand public access to agency decisions . . . .”); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV 342, 439 (2004) (“Both federal and state agencies are constructing Web sites with
rulemaking documents, which allow citizens to submit electronic comments on proposed
rules.”); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Future of Electronic Rulemaking: A Research Agenda, ADMIN.
& REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2002, at 6 (“The second purpose of the transformation of rulemaking
is a participatory one—making it possible for participants to participate in real time . . . .”); Beth
Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 433 (2004)
[hereinafter Noveck, Electronic Revolution] (“Informal rulemaking . . . is about to be
transformed by the silent revolution of e-government . . . .”); Beth Simone Noveck, The Future
of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State, 1 I/S 1, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Noveck, Citizen
Participation] (“Now the crafting of regulations will shift from a paper-based to a fully
electronic lawmaking process.”); Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably
Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S 111, 111 (2005) (“The evolution of information and
communication technologies has the potential to revolutionize citizen participation in the
democratic process.”); Steven L. Clift, E-Government and Democracy: Representation and
Citizen Engagement in the Information Age 2 (Feb. 2004), http://www.publicus.net/
articles/cliftegovdemocracy.doc (“Leading governments, with democratic intent, are
incorporating information and communication technologies into their e-government
activities.”).
2. Probably the most comprehensive lists can be found in Noveck, Citizen Participation,
supra note 1, and in Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemaking 7
(Regulatory Pol’y Program, Working Paper RPP-2003-05, 2003), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2003-05.pdf. See also Robert Carlitz &
Rosemary Gunn, E-Rulemaking: A New Avenue for Public Engagement, 1 J. PUB.
DELIBERATION Article 7, at 5 (2005), available at http://services.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1008&context=jpd; Clift, supra note 1.
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and collaborative communications from individuals during the
rulemaking process, and could make it easier for people and entities
to monitor the implementation and enhance the enforcement of rules.
My focus in this Article is on proposals to integrate electronic
communications into the rulemaking process as a means of increasing
communications to agencies from any and all interested citizens.3 As I
noted above, there are many other possible ways that information
technologies could influence rulemaking, but the changes that seem
to generate the most excitement are those that would allow any
citizens who cared about a particular issue to give their input to
agencies.4 The reason for this excitement, and thus for my choice of
focus, is that the rulemaking process is perceived as one that is
dominated by interest groups and is largely opaque to the public at
large.5 Providing for feedback from electronic sensors to agencies, or
for easier communications from agencies to individuals, may be a
good way to improve agencies’ efficiency; but providing for more
effective communication from interested citizens to agencies could
transform rulemaking more profoundly, or so its proponents suggest.
If people can communicate easily with the agency and collaborate
easily with each other in formulating their communications to the
agency, and if the agency then modifies its decisions in light of those
communications, then the rulemaking process itself will be reshaped.
Anyone interested in a particular rulemaking initiative could get
involved, with a realistic belief that her input could make a difference;
and the reasonableness of that belief could lead many others to get
involved as well, producing an upward spiral of individual

3. For this reason, I do not focus on suggestions that agencies select a small group of
citizens and get their feedback in the form of a focus group or virtual jury. See Coglianese,
Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 12 (noting the possibility of virtual juries and
regulatory polling); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (same).
4. See Brandon & Carlitz, supra note 1, at 1422 (“[T]he federal government should build a
transparent online environment that encourages public input.”); Coglianese, Internet and
Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 33 (expressing the popular view that the Internet may
revolutionize citizen participation in rulemaking); Elena Larsen & Lee Raine, The Rise of the ECitizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ Web Sites (Pew Internet & American Life
Project 2002), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Govt_Website_Rpt.pdf (noting
rise in the use of the Internet to send comments on policy choices of public officials).
5. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 113, 189 (3d ed. 2003); Coglianese, Internet and Citizen
Participation, supra note 1, at 38–40 (summarizing data on who participates in agency
rulemaking process); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process:
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 265 (1998)
(noting that interest groups and businesses dominate rulemaking submissions).
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involvement that would change rulemaking into a truly participatory
6
process.
That, at any rate, is the hope of the proponents of e-rulemaking
7
(the term I will use in this Article as convenient shorthand). The
purpose of this Article is to discuss the likelihood and the desirability
of that transformation. Other commentators have considered these
issues (often briefly), but their descriptive efforts have usually
focused on two institutional players—agencies and individuals—and
have not focused on the role of Congress and the courts.8 The latter in
particular are major players; significant rulemakings are frequently
challenged in federal court, and judicial review thus affects
rulemaking to a significant degree. In this Article, I attempt to take
fuller account of all the possible effects of the implementation of erulemaking initiatives on the rulemaking process. I find that there is a
strong basis to doubt that e-rulemaking will have much of a positive
impact on rulemaking. I then turn to the question of evaluation with
the broad range of costs and benefits in mind. The question of
evaluation raises one of the most basic questions in administrative

6. Furthermore, according to one school of thought, such a transformation of rulemaking
would give it much greater democratic legitimacy. Many theorists have emphasized the
importance of discussions among citizens in a democracy, suggesting that democratic legitimacy
requires meaningful political exchange among citizens. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 136 (1984) (“[T]here can be
no strong democratic legitimacy without ongoing talk.”); EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 89 (1957) (“The more that deliberation and reflection and a critical
spirit play a considerable part in the course of public affairs, the more democratic the nation.”);
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 184–87 (1995) (discussing and adopting such a
theory of democracy). In this spirit, transforming rulemaking into a participatory process would
increase its democratic legitimacy.
7. See ELAINE CIULLA KAMARCK & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., GOVERNANCE.COM:
DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2002); Beierle, supra note 1, at 155 (arguing that
Internet-based rulemaking participation opens the prospect for vastly increased participation);
Brandon & Carlitz, supra note 1, at 1422 (recognizing that “the Internet could fundamentally
change how the public participates in federal policymaking,” but noting need for further
innovations in participative forums); Clift, supra note 1, at 2 (considering potential democracyenhancing aspects of Internet rulemaking); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 170 (2004) (“People with good ideas—even those who
never get to Washington or their state capitals—thereby can have a chance to shape policy
outcomes.”); Johnson, supra note 1, at 279 (noting the potential for the Internet to expand
rulemaking participation); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the potential
for enhanced participation but arguing that further innovation in the participative forums is
required).
8. See generally Coglianese, E-Rulemaking, supra note 1 (considering the interaction of
administrative agencies and the public in e-rulemaking); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra
note 1 (same); Shulman, supra note 1 (same).
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law—do we want greater public participation in the rulemaking
process? In my view, that age-old question takes on a slightly
different character when significant collaboration among individuals
is relatively easy, as is arguably the case with some electronic
communications tools. Even in light of these new tools, however,
there are still good reasons to be skeptical about the impact and
desirability of e-rulemaking. The problem is that the experience with
e-rulemaking has been too modest, and thus the level of
experimentation has been too small, to reach a firm conclusion that
the costs of e-rulemaking outweigh the benefits. The combination of
justified skepticism and the lack of empirical confirmation leads me to
the ultimate conclusion that the government should self-consciously,
rigorously, and narrowly experiment with e-rulemaking, treating
agencies as laboratories of democracy. Such experimentation would
allow researchers both to evaluate e-rulemaking proposals specifically
and to gain information about the rulemaking process more generally.
States may or may not serve as good laboratories, but in this instance
I think that agencies have the potential to be excellent ones.
Part I briefly summarizes proposals to enhance public
participation in the rulemaking process. Part II then turns to the
question of impact, asking how those proposals might affect the
various players in the rulemaking process, including individuals,
agencies, Congress, and the courts. Finally, Part III considers those
impacts in evaluating the desirability of the e-rulemaking proposals.
My ultimate conclusion is that the uncertainties about the impact and
desirability of e-rulemaking are sufficiently great that experimenting
with e-rulemaking should proceed on a trial basis, in an attempt to
gain greater empirical grounding before the government plunges into
any particular set of changes to the rulemaking process.
I. WHAT SORTS OF CHANGES AM I TALKING ABOUT?
The integration of information technologies in general, and the
Internet in particular, into the rulemaking process could take myriad
forms. Even among technologies designed to enhance participation
by any and all interested citizens, there are many possible variations. I
will briefly summarize the main possibilities.
Starting with the most straightforward and modest changes,
integrating the Internet into rulemaking can make it easier for
ordinary citizens to comment on agency rulemaking proposals.
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9
Agencies began taking steps in this direction in the 1990s. Agencies
have allowed people to comment via electronic submissions
(including via e-mail), making it easier for them to present their views
to the agency. Moreover, some agencies have digitized their
processes, so that all comments are available online.10
More recently, the federal government has moved to centralize
and unify e-rulemaking procedures through the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) and the Regulations.gov website. That
website (which has been running since 2003) has links for documents
open for comment and for lists of regulations by topic and date, as
11
well as search tools for regulations. More ambitiously, the aim of the
docket management system is to store, and allow for retrieval of, all
12
agency documents related to rulemaking.
The centralizing tendency reflected in the federal docket
management system and Regulations.gov has potential benefits in the
form of economies of scale and making it easier for citizens to track
and comment on any pending regulations, but it also reduces the
chances that agencies will experiment with e-rulemaking initiatives on
their own. As I discuss in Part III.D, I believe that is a significant cost.
In any event, these measures put comments online, but they do
not create possibilities beyond those already available on paper. One
can easily imagine broader changes, though. Indeed, a number of
commentators have proposed them.13 Individuals could post a

9. See generally UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRONIC
RULEMAKING: PROGRESS MADE IN DEVELOPING CENTRALIZED E-RULEMAKING SYSTEM
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05777.pdf (chronicling impact of erulemaking efforts).
10. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, makes all submissions
available on its website at http://www.fcc.gov.
11. Cary Coglianese et al., Unifying Rulemaking Information: Recommendations for the
New Federal Docket Management System, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 621, 628 (2005).
12. See id. at 628 (“Essentially, the FDMS will make the public records of rulemaking
activities, in their entirety, readily available via the Internet to anyone interested in tracking
government rulemaking.”); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Funds for E-Docket Filed Under ‘No,’
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at D1 (noting delays in the completion of the docket management
system).
13. See generally Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (arguing that
existing efforts to apply information technology to rulemaking are unlikely to vastly increase
citizen participation, but acknowledging that newer technologies may facilitate such a result);
Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (suggesting that changes in the software used for erulemaking are necessary to facilitate greater participation); Shulman, supra note 1 (expressing
skepticism over the ability of the Internet to change rulemaking significantly, at least in light of
current technologies).
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response to a given communication, or set of communications,
producing threaded comments resembling a dialogue that would
allow other individuals (and ultimately the agency) to see a string of
communications on a given topic. Either in addition to or instead of
such procedures, individuals could review electronic communications
to the agency and electronically join or endorse one or more with
14
which they agreed. Similarly, individuals could rate comments on a
scale from one to ten, which would allow for greater differentiation in
levels of endorsement (or non-endorsement) of existing comments.
Such a system would permit individuals and the agency to see which
contributions others deemed valuable.
Indeed, the rating system could be set up so that the raters
15
themselves were rated. Many websites use this model, allowing users
to rate communications and allowing them also to rate other raters.16
17
Perhaps the most successful use of such a system is Slashdot, a
website that consists of technology-related news stories and
comments on those stories.18 Slashdot begins with a filter—anyone
can submit a story, but editors filter out the ones that they do not
want to include. Once stories survive that filter, user-based ratings
come to the fore: users submit comments on stories (often hundreds
of comments), other users rate those comments, and some users—
designated as “moderators,” or meta-raters—rate other people’s
ratings. The result is that a visitor to the Slashdot website can see at a
glance what stories have been highly rated by people whose views are
considered valuable by people who themselves have been judged to
be good raters.

14. The “join” versus “endorse” distinction might matter a great deal to the creator of the
original communication if the potential endorser was someone with whom the creator did not
wish to associate. If, for example, a scientist writes a comment arguing for a particular position
on scientific grounds, she might not be enthused about a self-identified member of the Flat
Earth Society “joining” that comment, if joining meant having the Flat Earth member’s name
listed alongside that of the creator. Mere endorsement, by contrast, presumably would not have
the same connotation, because the endorsement would not entail actually joining, but instead
would be a separate document of support.
15. If desired, the raters’ raters could be rated, and so on.
16. Amazon.com, for example, uses such a system.
17. www.slashdot.com.
18. Slashdot bills itself as “News for Nerds.” Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux
and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 393 (2002).
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Slashdot users do not produce a final product or decision—
19
Slashdot just enables their comments and allows for ratings of them.
But individuals could work together toward a jointly produced
submission to an agency. Agencies (or private entities) could allow
individuals to post their concerns and solicit interest from others who
might want to draft a shared comment. This would be akin to a
bulletin board where a person could express a concern and seek codrafters of a comment. Entities could also foster collaboration by
setting up the online collaborations themselves. Some existing
computer programs allow for individual involvement, although most
of those programs entail a relatively small group of individuals acting
as “policy juries.”20 But there is a well-known existing model that
allows any and all interested individuals to participate in a shared
project—wikis. A wiki is an online collaboration to which anyone can
contribute. The basic characteristic of wikis is that anyone can add or
edit existing content.21 The best known, and probably the most
successful wiki is Wikipedia.org, an open encyclopedia available on
the Web. The idea behind wikis is the content equivalent of the
programmer’s notion that “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow.”22 In the words of Wikipedia: “[O]ne of the great advantages
of the Wiki system is that incomplete or poorly written first drafts of
articles can evolve into polished, presentable masterpieces through
the process of collaborative editing. This gives our approach an
advantage over other ways of producing similar end-products.”23

19. “Regardless of [Slashdot’s] scalability, they do not structure decisions, just a series of
conversations.” A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 871 (2003).
20. Beth Noveck discusses some of these at length. See Noveck, Electronic Revolution,
supra note 1, at 495–510 (2004) (discussing models for online citizen policy juries).
21. WikiWikiWeb, http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiWikiWeb, is credited as the original Wiki.
Froomkin, supra note 19, at 861. WikiWikiWeb allows anyone to add or change content. In
2005, it instituted a delay, posting the following notice:
Note to all wiki spammers: As of 1-2-2005 no changes to this wiki, either by editing or
adding new pages, will be picked up by search engines until 10 hours have passed. All
spam on this site is usually deleted in minutes, an hour at the most, so it is now
pointless to try to add spam of any type to this wiki.
Wiki Wiki Web Faq, http://www.c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiWikiWebFaq (last visited July 10, 2006).
22. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (2002).
23. Wikipedia Editing Policy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Editing_policy (last visited July
10, 2006).
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II. WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL THESE CHANGES MAKE?
So there are lots of proposals designed to use information
technologies to increase citizen participation in rulemaking. What,
exactly, would implementation of these proposals change? The most
obvious set of changes, and the one on which commentators have
focused, centers on the actions of individuals in the rulemaking
process and agencies’ responses to them. As I shall discuss, that
ignores other important actors, such as Congress and the courts. But I
begin with the behavior of individuals, and the effect of that behavior
on agencies.
A. Impact on Ordinary Individuals’ Participation
The proposed changes could have an enormous effect on
individuals’ participation in agency rulemaking. The goal of the
proposals is to make the rulemaking process more interactive, and it
is entirely possible that ordinary individuals will respond
enthusiastically to a more interactive process. Ordinary individuals
might get actively involved in the rulemaking process—proposing
language, responding to agency proposals, and responding to
proposals from other commenters. Moreover, if the early adopters
are excited about their involvement, they might encourage others to
get involved, with the result that involvement in rulemaking would
become a truly mass undertaking.
Of course, it is possible that public participation will not increase
significantly, even if all the proposals for changing rulemaking are
implemented. The proposals lower the costs of participation, but it
may be that relatively few people are sufficiently interested for this
lowering of the barriers to their involvement to make a difference. I
discuss the existing data in Part III.C; so far, the Internet has not
significantly increased individual participation in the rulemaking
process. Although this is disappointing for e-rulemaking advocates,
the data do not rule out the possibility that the e-rulemaking
initiatives will produce some increase in public participation. Indeed,
it seems likely that, for some individuals, the decrease in the costs of
their participation, combined with the promise of greater
effectiveness, will make the difference between participating and not
participating.
New rulemakings are initiated every day, making this a multipleround interaction. As a result (and importantly), if the e-rulemaking
initiatives result in a political groundswell among individuals with
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respect to a given rule, and the government’s ultimate action seems to
be positively affected by that groundswell, then one might expect
both that the individuals will feel good about their participation and
that the success of those individuals will persuade yet more
24
individuals to participate. Put a bit differently, if the individuals gain
pleasure from their participation in a successful movement (as seems
quite plausible), then the prospect of that pleasure becomes an
additional benefit to potential participants that might make the
difference for those on the margin. There would be a virtuous circle
of participation.25
For better or worse, the converse is true: if e-rulemaking
produces a groundswell that seems to make no difference in the
ultimate action the government takes, that would probably tend to
dampen enthusiasm, both among the new participants and among the
potential participants at the margin, who now would not have an
additional reason to join. Indeed, the frustration entailed in spending
time on communications that have no impact on the agency might
create a reason not to join. And the more this happened, the greater
one would expect the dampening to be. The circle would be vicious,
instead of virtuous, as fewer and fewer individuals saw much point in
participating.
This discussion highlights the importance of the other players in
this process—agencies, Congress, and the courts. I now turn to that
discussion.
B. Impact on Agencies’ Rulemaking
The e-rulemaking proposals could affect agencies in a number of
ways. First, creating more ambitious mechanisms for meaningful
interaction will consume agency resources. All but the most basic
proposals will require that each agency reconfigure its website and
alter its existing rulemaking procedures to some degree. This
probably will not constitute a very great cost to the agency, but
(unlike the costs I discuss below) it will exist whether or not
participation increases. So if it turns out that implementation of these
e-rulemaking proposals does not increase individuals’ participation,

24. By “ultimate action,” I mean to include not merely the rule the agency proffers, but
also subsequent judicial review (if it occurs), and even congressional changes to the rule (which
is unlikely but of course possible). I discuss Congress and the courts in the next section.
25. The virtue, here, is in the eye of the beholder—particularly based on one’s views of the
desirability of individuals influencing agency behavior. See infra Part III.C.
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the agency will have incurred costs without any compensating
benefits.
Assuming, though, that the proposals do increase public
participation to at least some degree, there will be other impacts on
the agency. Those impacts will depend on the nature of the additional
communications that individuals send.
1. Increases in Quantity Only. It may be that implementing
these proposals simply increases the quantity of messages without
adding any new ideas. One way this could occur is if the entirety of
the increase takes the form of individuals endorsing pre-existing
messages (e.g., adding their names to a list of endorsers, or
transmitting verbatim a form letter that was sent to them). If so, the
cost to the agency would likely be small. As long as a computer
program could pick up the fact that the new messages were identical
to others that were received, the program could log those additional
messages without any human having to read each of the duplicate
messages. So, with any luck, the additional expenditure of resources
would be modest.
The impact on the agency would be greater, however, if messages
were substantively identical but were formulated differently enough
that the agency’s computer program did not recognize them as
identical. If, for example, individuals did not send a form e-mail but
instead composed their own messages making the same point (e.g.,
saying that raising the permissible level of soot would make it harder
for people to breathe versus saying that an increase would adversely
affect individuals’ respiration), then humans would have to read each
message in order to determine if it presented any new ideas. In fact,
“[i]nterest groups have been known to encourage their members to
take steps to make it hard for an agency to treat a mass of comments
26
as if they were just X number of form letters.” This need not occupy
the time of any senior agency officials—indeed, agencies often farm
out such reading to other entities. But if even one percent of the U.S.
adult population commented on a given rulemaking, producing, say, a
few hundred thousand comments that were sufficiently different to

26. Fred Emery & Andrew Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by
Improving Comments, 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8 (Fall 2005), available at http://www.
abanet.org/adminlaw/news/adlaw_fall2005.pdf.
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require a human reader, the costs of plowing through those comments
27
would be considerable.
The government might be able to reduce those costs to some
degree insofar as programmers could increase the sophistication of
the computer programs that read comments (although such programs
would entail their own expenses) and could have confidence in the
programs’ ability to make ever more discerning determinations as to
28
which comments really were duplicative. But it is hard to imagine
that any program could accurately find the vast majority of
substantive overlaps (much less all of them), given that the words
used might be so different. Once people started using their own
idiosyncratic word formulations, it would be extraordinarily unlikely
that any program could find all the overlaps. So the costs of having
human readers will remain, even if they are somewhat reduced.
What impact would an increase in quantity have on a given
rulemaking? One way of looking at the question is to ask, what
information does the agency receive that it would not already have?
By hypothesis, it is hearing no new arguments or ideas. All it is
learning is that X number of people felt strongly enough to
participate. That has some significance if (a) the agency is unsure of
public sentiment on the issue, (b) it concludes that the number of
messages is a good indicator of public sentiment, and (c) it decides
that public sentiment is relevant to its regulatory outcome. I doubt
that all three of those conditions will obtain very often. If an agency
wants to count noses, public opinion polls with randomized samples
will give a more accurate count.29 That said, strength of preference has

27. I suggest a few hundred thousand different comments on the theory that there would
be some duplication that a sophisticated computer program would recognize. If each member of
my hypothetical one percent used his or her own words, or if five percent of the adult populace
commented instead of that hypothetical one percent, then humans would have to read well over
a million comments.
28. See generally Hui Yang & Jamie Callan, Near-Duplicate Detection for eRulemaking
(Carnegie Mellon Univ. Language Tech. Inst., 2005), available at http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.
edu/doc/papers/dgo05-huiyang.pdf (discussing computer programs that should be able to detect
form letters with very slight differences from the model form letter).
29. See Thomas C. Beierle, Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic
Deliberation 11 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003) (suggesting that erulemaking may produce “a cacophony of unreflective comments [that] tempts rule writers to
lapse into preference aggregation, counting up support and disagreement in an inappropriate
application of a voting model”); Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at
55–56 (“[S]ystematic and substantial increases in citizen comments would shift regulators’
attention away from selecting the policy option that best fulfills their statutory mandate or the
public interest, and instead lead regulators to strive to satisfy the views expressed by those who
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some significance, and the number of messages will indicate
something about strength of preferences—those who take the time to
communicate are likely to have stronger feelings on the issue than the
average person does. But there is a distinct possibility (maybe a
probability) of a skewed sample of those who really care about the
issue.30 For example, the average online commenters will tend to have
higher than average wealth (as Web users more generally have higher
than average wealth). In other ways, too, e-rulemaking participants
may be a skewed sample. Maybe the rulemaking was publicized on
websites frequented by people who are on one side of the issue and
not publicized on websites frequented by people of the opposite view.
Or maybe people with the opposite view tend not to frequent
websites, or more simply tend not to use computers and thereby avail
themselves of the e-rulemaking process. To pick an obvious example,
a proposed regulation of online indecency is likely to attract
comments from a population that is disproportionately opposed to
such regulation, simply because it seems likely that opposition to such
regulation would be positively correlated with use of the Web.31 And
32
of course there is the potential for manipulation by interest groups —
which, as I discuss in Part III, has already occurred with respect to email comments on proposed rulemakings.33
Finally, even if the agency concludes that the number of
messages is a good indicator of public sentiment, it may also conclude
that such sentiment is irrelevant to its mission. Many statutes leave no

file comments. This problem would move the process closer to making rules by plebiscite, which
will risk giving undue prominence to expedient or even erroneous considerations.”).
30. Notably, in response to the FDA’s proposed regulation of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco there was “a massive tobacco company-orchestrated campaign [that] generated some
300,000 pieces of mail – nearly half of all of the mail received by the agency on this topic.”
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,395, 44,418 n.34 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801). Such a concerted effort may reveal more about the organizing
ability and wealth of those on one side of a regulation than it does about citizens’ strength of
preference.
31. In this regard it is unsurprising that there was more organized opposition to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 among Web users than there was organized support for
it.
32. See Peter Strauss, The ABA Ad Law Section’s E Rulemaking Survey, 29 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 8, 10 (Spring 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/
adlaw_spring2004.pdf (stating that “it is not hard to imagine manipulative campaigns exploiting
tools of spam to proliferate comments dramatically”); Emery & Emery, supra note 26, at 8
(noting that such a “rulemaking arms race” is already occurring).
33. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
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room for an agency to consider public sentiment. When Congress tells
34
an agency to regulate based on scientific findings, or based on its
conclusions about the existence of harms to competition,35 or based
on what a given set of companies would need in order to compete
36
effectively in the marketplace, it does not leave a role for public
opinion. In such situations, if an agency did consider public sentiment
37
a reviewing court would likely find that it had acted unlawfully.
I am aware of no statute that actually directs an agency to
consider the public’s views. Some statutes have language that might
seem to permit the agency to consider the public’s views. Most
notably, a number of agencies created in the New Deal era are
directed to regulate certain areas consistent with “the public interest,
38
convenience, or necessity.” But this language was used in statutes
when the prevailing vision for agency heads was that they would be
politically insulated experts who would act in what they concluded
was the public interest and not in response to public sentiment.39 The
34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2643(d)(7) (2000) (requiring the collection and dissemination of
information about asbestos “based on the best available scientific evidence,” which “shall be
revised, republished, and redistributed as appropriate, to reflect new scientific findings”); 16
U.S.C.A. § 669c(d)(1)(D) (2000) (requiring the development of a “wildlife conservation strategy
based upon the best available and appropriate scientific information and data”).
35. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 761(a)(1) (2000) (providing that the FCC “may not issue a license
or construction permit to any separated entity, or renew or permit the assignment or use of any
such license or permit, or authorize the use by any entity subject to United States jurisdiction of
any space segment owned, leased, or operated by any separated entity, unless the Commission
determines that such issuance, renewal, assignment, or use will not harm competition in the
telecommunications market of the United States”).
36. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000) (“In determining what network elements should
be made available . . . , the [FCC] shall consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such
network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access
to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking
access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.”).
37. The irrelevance of public opinion to agencies’ legislative mandate does not, of course,
mean that there is no role for comments from the public. The sections of the Administrative
Procedure Act governing informal rulemaking put public comments at the center of the process.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (stating that agencies “shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments”).
Congress’s directions to agencies as to the basis upon which they should act determines which
arguments contained in those comments are relevant to the agency’s decision and which are not.
Agencies will accept virtually any comments, in other words, but only some put forward
arguments that are within the agency’s purview.
38. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to regulate licenses consistent
with “the public interest, convenience and necessity”).
39. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28 (1938) (noting that the
administrative process “promotes expertness . . . [which] makes for much more effective public
responsibility”). On the centrality of Landis’ vision, and role, in the creation of New Deal
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history of the implementation of that language has been that agencies
have reached their own conclusions, and have not invoked public
sentiment in support of their positions. I cannot exclude, of course,
the possibility that the agencies were persuaded by public sentiment
but declined to reveal this fact, but the agencies have not so indicated.
One striking example was the Federal Communications
40
Commission’s 2003 rulemaking on media ownership rules. The
Commission received more than one million comments, 99.9 percent
of which were opposed to its proposed rules.41 Nonetheless it
promulgated those rules in largely the form it had proposed, by the
42
exact 3–2 vote everyone expected. The overwhelming sentiment
against the rules in the comments appears to have had no effect.43

agencies authorized to act in the public interest, see generally DONALD M. RITCHIE, JAMES M.
LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980).
40. In re 2002 Biennial Reg. Review--Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules &
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Sec. 202 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 FCC Ownership Order].
41. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[N]early two
million people weighed in by letters, postcards, e-mails, and petitions to oppose further
relaxation of the [media ownership] rules.”); 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 40, at
13,957 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting). As Commissioner Copps stated in his dissent to the
Commission’s order (when the comments had not yet topped the one-million mark):
This proceeding has generated three-quarters of a million comments now—more than
any other proceeding that I am aware of in the history of the FCC. Of those
comments, all but a few hundred are from individual citizens. And of those, nearly
every one opposes increased media consolidation—over 99.9 percent!
Id.; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Deregulating the Media: Comments Showed Solid Opposition, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2003, at C8. (“More than 520,000 comments on the proceeding were sent in by
citizens . . . . [and] nearly all of them were against relaxing media ownership rules.”).
42. This does not mean, however, that there was no point in so many people filing those
comments. The need to wade through so many comments occupied a fair amount of time and
thus may have slowed down the FCC. More importantly, the strategy of the leaders of the
groups that pushed for the comments was to set up the FCC for reversal in the courts, not to
change the FCC’s own decision. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
43. Indeed, the FCC’s characterization of these comments so indicates. In its media
ownership order (when it had received hundreds of thousands of comments, but not yet one
million), the FCC stated that
We received more than 500,000 brief comments and form letters from individual
citizens. These individual commenters expressed general concerns about the potential
consequences of media consolidation, including concerns that such consolidation
would result in a significant loss of viewpoint diversity and affect competition. We
share the concerns of these commenters that our ownership rules protect our critical
diversity and competition goals, as they are designed to do, and we believe that the
rules adopted herein serve our public interest goals, take account of and protect the
vibrant media marketplace, and comply with our statutory responsibilities and limits.
2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 40, at 13,624. The reference to “brief comments and
form letters” and to the “general concerns” they contained, combined with the FCC’s response
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2. Increases in Quality as Well as Quantity. The larger goal of erulemaking advocates is not merely more quantity, but also more
quality. Ideally, as I noted above, individuals will put forward points
that otherwise would not have been presented to the agency, or at
least they will sharpen points that might otherwise have been lost in
the mass of comments.44
If that happens, the agency will obviously have to devote
considerable human resources to sifting through the messages. By
hypothesis, individuals are putting forward new points, or variations
on points that others have made. To determine exactly what
information these new participants are putting forth, the agency will
need to have someone (or, more likely, a phalanx of people) reading
the messages with some care. And as the sheer number of messages
rises, the burdens of reading them rise. In this way, increasing the
number of messages is at cross-purposes with the goal of sharpening
points that would otherwise get lost in the shuffle: the larger the
number of messages the agency must review, the greater the danger a
powerful argument will be overlooked. The only way to avoid that
problem is to devote substantial resources to the careful reading of
each message—quite an undertaking if there are hundreds of
thousands of nonduplicative messages.
Significantly, these costs will arise whenever there are messages
that a computer program cannot match as being identical—even if the
nonduplicative messages in fact make identical points and thus add
quantity without adding any new information. The agency cannot
know a priori whether the messages that the program fails to match
are merely using different words to make the same point, or instead
are using different words to make a slightly different point. So the
agency must carefully read all the messages that the program cannot
match as duplicative, in order to ensure that it does not miss the new
or different point. Accordingly, the costs outlined in the previous
section are actually higher than they might first appear.45

in the next sentence at a similarly high level of generality, do not inspire the sense that the FCC
found these comments terribly helpful or influential.
44. An example of the latter would entail individuals finding a comment with which they
agreed and making a similar argument more effectively.
45. This does not necessarily mean that costs per regulation would increase. It is possible
that an increase in costs at one stage (here, the commenting process) will produce a greater
reduction in costs at another stage (by reducing the time it takes to issue the rule, or the
likelihood of litigation after the regulation is promulgated). In such a situation, the total costs
per regulation would not increase. The problem is that there is neither evidence nor much
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Note that increased costs per regulation mean that unless
Congress increases the spending for agencies to cover these increased
46
costs, agencies will be able to issue fewer regulations. They may
pursue fewer regulations from the outset (if for each regulation an
agency adds additional resources sufficient to cover the costs), or they
may pursue the same number of regulations but then spend a longer
time or more money promulgating each one, but the net result at the
end of the day (or, more to the point, the end of an administration’s
four-year term) will be fewer regulations.
What difference will this new input make? Assuming it is
relevant to the agency’s statutory mandate, it might make a big
difference.47 If the additional messages put forward points that the
agency would not have considered in the absence of those messages
then they could help to shape the ultimate regulation. Two basic
conditions are necessary for this to occur: (a) the points must be ones
that the agency would not have received from other sources, or
thought of on its own; and (b) they must actually persuade the
agency—or at least persuade a court that the agency should have
taken them more seriously (I take up this latter possibility in the next
section).
reason to support this proposition, and some evidence that cuts the other way. As for the
reasoning, I am talking here about an agency devoting more resources to determining the
content of messages. There is no reason to expect that spending more time reading messages
will systematically shorten, or otherwise make more efficient, the regulatory process. Nor will
the fact of reading additional input from individuals tend to reduce litigation against the agency,
unless (a) the agency changes its regulation in accordance with the wishes of that additional
input (an assumption that I discuss next), (b) the people placated by that change would have
challenged the regulation, and would have been the only ones to do so, and (c) the change does
not aggrieve a new set of potential litigants who are at least as likely to bring litigation. As for
the evidence, as I discuss shortly, negotiated rulemaking was designed to let stakeholders reach
a consensus about regulations before the notice and comment process began, in the expectation
that this would shorten the notice and comment process and reduce the likelihood of litigation.
The actual experience with negotiated rulemaking, however, has been that it does neither. See
infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
46. And, of course, even if Congress does increase agencies’ funding to cover the costs, that
money has to come from somewhere—either from cuts in other programs or from additional
borrowing or taxation.
47. If, in response to a regulation mandating that an agency reduce the emissions of a
minor pollutant “to the extent feasible,” Person A sends an irrelevant message (e.g., “Please do
not regulate this pollutant, because I like inhaling it” or “Please reduce emissions to X level,
because otherwise I’ll die in the next few days”), and Person B then makes a slightly different
argument (e.g., “Many people like to inhale this pollutant, so please keep the level reasonably
high” or “Many people fear this pollutant, so please ban it to allay their concerns”), these
messages are still irrelevant to the statutory mandate. The additional argument does not give
the agency useful guidance.
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As for the first point, there is reason to doubt. First, for any
major agency action, there are dozens of interested parties who are
well-paid to find every point that can help their side—and virtually
every side is represented. That said, most existing commenters
represent interest groups, and it may be that even groups styling
themselves as representing ordinary people or consumers’ interests in
48
fact fail to do so. In particular, the existing commenters may tend to
underproduce both public goods themselves (e.g., data that are in the
public’s interest) and arguments supporting the creation of public
goods. But interest groups that oppose a regulation know that they,
like all commenters, should couch their comments to the agency in
terms of the public interest, as both the statutory mandate and the
political realities call for such arguments. So the question is whether
an interest group that strongly opposes a proposed regulation for selfregarding reasons will put forward all the public-regarding data and
arguments that a new individual commenter might want to bring
forward. To put the proposition differently, it may be that the
additional participants enabled by e-rulemaking would find that their
“new” public-regarding points had in fact already been made to the
agency by other commenters, even though those other commenters
might have acted in their own private interests.
Second, the agency itself may have thought of the points that the
additional individual participants would make. After all, the agency is
generally supposed to act in the public interest, and presumably the
reason the agency proposed the regulation in the first place is that it
recognized the public interest considerations in favor of its plan.49
Third, if neither existing commenters nor the agency would have
48. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 95 (1987) (“The [Consumer
Federation of America] may have represented the interests associated with the mentality of a
Consumers Reports reader, but it did not appear to lobby on behalf of poor, rural folk for whom
the rule will provide little benefit and perhaps significant burden.”); Mark Tushnet, Foreword:
The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 29, 79 n.240 (1999) (“[S]o-called public interest groups . . . . are staffed and funded by the
relatively well-to-do, and their programs are determined by what the professional elites perceive
to be the interests of the persons on whose behalf they are acting.”); C. Frederick Beckner, III,
Note, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 548 (1993) (“[Many] self-styled public
interest groups do not represent the interests of the public as a whole, but instead exploit
consumer fear in order to aggrandize the political power necessary for their existence.”).
49. For those readers who think the previous sentence is fanciful or hopelessly naive,
because agencies are captured, then the additional messages enabled by e-rulemaking may
make new points, but they are likely to be disregarded by the captured agency. See infra note 50
and accompanying text.
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come up with a particular point on its own, the question remains
whether the additional increment of participants enabled by erulemaking would do so. One’s answer about the likelihood of new
input ultimately depends, then, on one’s sense of the degree to which
interest groups and agencies really do put forward all the relevant
points, and, if they do not, the realistic chances that the new
participants enabled by e-rulemaking will, in fact, add relevant points.
If the existing participants fail to represent public-regarding views but
new participants would represent them, then the first condition would
be satisfied.
Note that the points in the preceding paragraph about
participants and agencies focus on public-regarding arguments and
data. That does not exhaust the additional information that the new
participants under e-rulemaking might offer. They may submit
additional input that is not public regarding, but instead advances
their own private interests or their own idiosyncratic views. If the
additional increment of messages is so composed, this raises questions
about the normative value of such input and the chances that such
input will affect the agency in desirable ways.
Turning to the second question noted above (whether the new
information persuades the agency), the answer depends on how
agencies actually operate. How often are agencies convinced by
arguments and data put forward in formal messages (as opposed to
informal communications that occur outside the agencies’ routinized
processes, or direction from political actors)? Note that many
commentators have argued that the influential communications to
agencies occur outside the rulemaking process delineated by the
Administrative Procedure Act. In Don Elliott’s words,
“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as
Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized
process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which
50
in real life takes place in other venues.” But also note that part of
the goal of e-rulemaking is to change that dynamic—to make
individual participation more useful and relevant to agencies. The
question is whether the additional increment of messages that erulemaking generates will in fact create that change.

50. E. Donald Elliott, Comment, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492
(1992).
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This inquiry about the degree to which agencies are persuaded
by comments is part of a larger inquiry that is central to the question
of the effectiveness of the new participation enabled by e-rulemaking:
are agencies so influenced by powerful political and/or industry forces
that the public-regarding arguments made by the new participants
will not persuade the agency? If agencies are captured by powerful
interest groups, or controlled by political forces, then the additional
messages will just be flotsam for the agency to disregard.
Putting the first question (will individuals add new information?)
with the second (will agencies be persuaded?) highlights the
prediction of many theories of agency behavior that the likelihood of
a significant impact from the additional messages is fairly low. If the
agency is captured, then the additional messages will not make a
difference. And if the agency is acting in a public-regarding manner
and is reasonably competent, then one should expect it to come up
with the good public-regarding arguments and data on its own. One
can tell a story in which the new messages might make a difference—
maybe the agency is so understaffed that no one creating the rule has
the time to think of the public-regarding considerations (but, if so, on
what basis did they propose the regulation in the first place?), or
maybe (less implausibly) the agency staffers are not smart enough to
come up with the good arguments and data on their own but are
smart enough to recognize them when they are made by others.
Simply put, many theories of agency behavior would suggest that the
additional participation enabled by e-rulemaking will not, in the end,
change agency behavior.
C. Impact on Congress and the Courts
As I noted above, commentators have largely focused on the
potential impact of e-rulemaking initiatives on the citizenry and on
agencies’ behavior in response. This focus is understandable—after
all, the agencies promulgate the rules. But the matter often does not
end there. In some situations, Congress countermands the agency’s
action. Admittedly, such congressional intervention is rare. Much
more common, of course, is a challenge to the legality of a rule by an
aggrieved party, which entails judicial review of the agency action.
1. Congress. Depending on what actually motivates members
of Congress, it is possible that an enhanced role for the Internet in
rulemaking will lead to more frequent congressional rejections of
agency actions. If (a) agencies make rulemaking more open to
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citizens’ electronic participation, with the result that in at least some
cases citizens mobilize more than they would have in the absence of
such electronic participation; and (b) if that greater mobilization leads
those citizens to lobby Congress about that rule more effectively than
they would have in the absence of their electronic participation; and
(c) if such increased mobilization can be the difference between
congressional action and congressional inaction on the rule, then erulemaking may indeed produce congressional actions that reject or
modify agency rulemakings after they are issued.
The idea behind e-rulemaking is that citizens will become more
involved in the process. Such a result is not obvious, but it is certainly
possible.51 Thus the first element of this causal chain seems
reasonable. The second element is reasonable, too, in that it requires
only that citizens be a bit more effective in lobbying Congress. The
biggest problem is in the third element. It is one thing for erulemaking to lead to somewhat more effective lobbying by Congress,
and quite another for that increase to be the difference between
congressional action and inaction. This is particularly so in light of the
rarity of post-issuance congressional actions that countermand or
modify agency rulemakings.52 So even if e-rulemaking does have some
effect on the margin of congressional behavior after rules are issued,
such an effect might not lead to any more congressional rejections or
modifications of agency rulemakings. That is, the paucity of successful

51. As I discuss in Part III, the evidence so far suggests that e-rulemaking initiatives have
not produced an increase in individual involvement in the rulemaking process. If an increase in
citizen participation does not, in fact, materialize, that presents a challenge not merely to a
suggestion of congressional involvement but more fundamentally to the desirability of erulemaking initiatives in the first place. See infra Part III.
52. Before INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), was decided, Congress routinely included
and acted upon legislative vetoes in legislation, which allowed one or both houses of Congress
to reverse agency actions. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (“[O]ver the past five decades, the
legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes.”). After Chadha, the difficulty of passing
congressional legislation rejecting or modifying agency actions led Congress to pass legislation
creating an expedited process for Congress to respond to agency decisions. See Contract with
America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–121, §§ 251–253, 110 Stat. 847, 868–74
(1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2000)). That legislation raised the prospect of
Congress’s countermanding many agency actions, but in fact it has been successfully used only
once since its enactment (to overturn ergonomic rules imposed on workplaces). See GARY
LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 108 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the legislation and
noting the rarity of its use); Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of
Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN L.
REV. 1051, 1052 (1999) (same); Julie A. Parks, Lessons in Politics: Initial Use of the
Congressional Review Act, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 188–89 (2003) (discussing the one successful
utilization of the congressional review process).
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cases may also indicate that there are precious few marginal cases,
such that e-rulemaking will in fact play out little differently from
ordinary rulemaking in Congress.
Congress directs agencies ex ante with much greater frequency.
Might e-rulemaking have an effect on congressional action that
shapes the action the agency will ultimately take? The short answer is
that there is little reason to suppose so. The idea behind e-rulemaking
is that citizens will become more engaged in the agency’s rulemaking
on a given issue. One could imagine that some of these citizens will
become interested in the agency’s workings more generally and thus
will pressure their members of Congress to direct the agency’s future
actions in a particular way, but that is a much more tenuous
connection. The big change promised by e-rulemaking proponents is
that it dramatically lowers the costs of participation in rulemaking for
citizens. But it doesn’t dramatically lower the costs of citizens
educating themselves about the business of the agency. Online
availability of agency regulations, and the possibilities for e-mail
communication among concerned citizens, may lower the costs of
citizens educating themselves, but those technologies are already in
place.
2. Courts. The branch that regularly responds to agency
rulemakings is of course the judiciary, not the legislative branch.
Agency rulemakings frequently do not end at the agency, but instead
are challenged by an aggrieved party and reviewed by federal courts.53

53. The exact percentage of agency rules that are challenged in court is not clear. The most
fulsome debate has revolved around EPA rulemakings. Many commentators have suggested
that 80 percent to 85 percent of EPA rulemakings are subject to challenge, but the better
estimates appear to be that the number is lower—closer to a quarter of all EPA rules and a third
of major EPA rules. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1298–1301 (1997) (finding that 26 percent of all
EPA rules issued from 1987 to 1991 and 35 percent of major EPA rules issued from 1980 to 1991
were challenged in court); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State
Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,371, 10,375 (Apr. 2001) (reporting that 33 percent of EPA major rules issued during the
1990s were challenged in court). But see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the
Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 334 (Autumn
1991) (“Both environmental organizations and industry took advantage of the increased judicial
access and together challenged between 80 and 85 percent of EPA’s major decisions.”);
Coglianese, supra, at app. D (collecting assertions that 80 percent of EPA rulemakings were
subject to challenge).
Significantly, those who are in the agencies apparently believe the higher numbers. See
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking,
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If e-rulemaking develops as its proponents suggest, it could have a
significant impact on this judicial review.
In the previous section I noted that increases in the quality of
messages must either persuade the agency or persuade a court that
the agency should have taken them more seriously. In that section I
discussed persuading the agency, and now I turn to persuading a
court.
A central element in judicial review of agency actions is the
question of whether the agency adequately considered relevant
materials. This arises to some degree in courts’ review of agencies’
factual findings. Courts will reject agency fact-finding under the
54
relevant standard (“arbitrary [or] capricious” in the context of
informal rulemakings and adjudications, “substantial evidence”55 for
formal rulemakings and adjudications) if the agency ignores evidence
that undercuts the agency’s position. But rejections of rulemakings
based on infirm factual findings are relatively rare. The more
common basis for rejecting a rulemaking is that an agency’s policy
decision was “arbitrary [or] capricious”—a standard that is
implemented via “hard look” review.56 Under such review, a court will
invalidate an agency action if the court determines that the agency
failed to take a hard look at the significant considerations against its
position.57 If an agency fails to offer an adequate explanation for its
87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514 (2002) (“[T]here is a general perception, shared by those who
study judicial review of administrative rules and those in the agencies, that most rules are
subject to challenge.”). More importantly, agency members do not know, in advance, which
rules will be challenged. So, once a significant percentage of rules are challenged, agency
members know that they need to write the rule to be prepared for future judicial review. As
Professor Mark Seidenfeld noted, “there is good reason to believe that rulemaking staff at many
agencies do worry from the outset about pleasing a court should the rule be challenged, and
therefore do not commit to an outcome before taking such review into account.” Id.
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C) (2000).
55. See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 474, 477–91 (1951) (delineating the
“substantial evidence” standard of review for findings of fact in formal agency proceedings).
56. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (finding that the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A) applies to agency
policy determinations and adopting hard look review); El Conejo Americano Inc. v. Dep’t of
Transp., 278 F.3d 17, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying the “hard look” standard).
57. As the Supreme Court elaborated in State Farm,
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” . . .
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
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rejection of such countervailing considerations, or promulgates a
regulation that fails to take into account relevant factors, a court will
58
invalidate the action.
The changes to rulemaking discussed in the previous sections
could have a significant impact upon hard look review, and thus upon
the likelihood of a court’s rejecting an agency’s action. The
significance of adding more people to the process has two
ramifications for judicial review of agencies. First, it produces more
sheer data. More communications to the agency mean more material
for the agency to digest.59 Second, those additional data mean more
ideas that a court might find to be alternatives at which the agency
should have taken a hard look.
As I have noted, it is the hope and expectation of those who are
excited about the possibilities for e-rulemaking that people will not
simply check a pre-existing box, or e-mail the same form letter that
every other individual is sending, but instead will contribute new
60
ideas. If that happens, agencies will have new points to consider.
What this means for aggrieved parties is that, if they discover a
comment that they believe is significant but that the agency did not
carefully consider, they will likely bring this to the court’s attention.
More substantive comments thus present more opportunities for
litigants to find something the agency overlooked. They also provide
more opportunities to find an area of disagreement (as to the
significance of an argument against the rule) between the agency and
the reviewing court.
The point about overlooking a comment is straightforward: if the
agency receives a hundred thousand comments, it may simply miss a
good argument presented in one of them. As to potential

counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)). Thus, an agency’s failure to respond to alternatives to its regulation or arguments that
undercut its action is “arbitrary [or] capricious” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
58. Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2004), provides a useful instantiation (and
discussion) of the differences between Chevron deference and hard look review, id. at 306–07.
59. This is not necessarily a bad thing, of course; I discuss its desirability in the next section.
See infra Part III.
60. If there are no additional participants, then e-rulemaking will have produced little
benefit and nontrivial costs. See supra Part II. If there are additional participants but they do not
contribute any new ideas, the agency will learn only that a bunch of people “voted” (via an emailed message) a particular way. I discuss the limited value of such a blunt signal in the
previous section. See supra notes 29–43 and accompanying text.
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disagreements, courts and agencies do not always concur as to
whether a given argument is significant enough or a given alternative
is sufficiently viable to require the agency to take a hard look. An
increase in new substantive communications translates into an
increase in the likelihood that the agency and the court will disagree
about the necessity of the agency’s considering one point that a
participant puts forward. Just one such failure can be fatal to a
regulation. When an agency declines to take a hard look at a
participant’s proposal but the court decides that the agency should
61
have done so, the court will find the regulation unlawful.
Interest groups are well aware of this, of course. In fact, interest
groups are often confident that their input will not affect the agency’s
action, but submit comments in an attempt to slow the agency down
and, more importantly, to create a record that will lead to judicial
invalidation of the agency’s action. Indeed, this apparently was the
case in the rulemaking that prodded more comments from individuals
than any other—the FCC’s proposed rule relaxing some media
ownership limits. More than a million individuals filed comments on
62
the proposed rulemaking (99.9 percent in opposition to it). The
leaders of the opposition, however, had no expectation that these
comments would affect the FCC. Instead, they saw them as an
opportunity to place in the record arguments and data that they could
invoke in the inevitable judicial challenge to the FCC’s actions, as
well as an opportunity to engage in political mobilization that might
influence Congress to reverse the media ownership rules after the

61. The finding of unlawfulness will frequently entail the court invalidating the regulation,
but in some cases the court will find the regulation unlawful but nonetheless remand the matter
without vacating the regulation. This practice is controversial, both as to its permissibility under
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (which provides that a reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious”) and as to its
desirability as a policy matter. Compare Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Silberman, J., separate opinion) (supporting remand without vacation under certain
circumstances), with id. at 490–93 (Randolph, J., separate opinion) (rejecting the legality of
remand without vacation); compare Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755–56 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (ordering remand without vacation), with id. at 757–58 (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the legality of remand without vacation); compare Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at
Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 360–
63 (2003) (defending the attractiveness of remand without vacation), with Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004) (contending that remand with vacation is unattractive).
62. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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63

FCC had issued them. The intended audience for their comments, in
other words, was the other two branches of government (and in
particular the courts).
This has enormous consequences for agencies. Either an agency
will have to devote substantially more resources to its rulemaking
process, or there will be a much greater likelihood of a court
invalidating the regulation. As to the resources, I noted above that
having lots of extra messages that a computer program cannot
identify as duplicative will consume agency resources, because
someone will have to read them. It might seem tempting to say that
the extra costs to the agency will not be that great, because it can give
those extra messages pretty short shrift (which, of course, undercuts
the value of having them in the first place). But the significance of
hard look review is that giving them short shrift increases the chances
that a court will invalidate the regulation. In an era when significant
rulemakings take about three years from start to finish, the costs of
invalidation are pretty high. So the looming possibility of judicial
review means that agencies really will need to read all those extra
messages, to avoid overlooking important arguments and data.
But reading the comments is not sufficient, and seriously
considering all the input that a reviewing court will later find to be
significant is even more costly. It is one thing to hire more commentreaders, and another entirely to require the agency officials who are
crafting the regulation to show that they have taken a hard look at the
raft of arguments and data. The usual demonstration of the agency’s
hard look appears in the agency’s explanation of its regulation—the
agency explains why X option is not attractive, or why Y argument is
not persuasive. In the absence of such an explicit discussion in its
explanation of its rule, the agency would need to be able to prove to
the court that it had, indeed, given serious consideration to these
other options—a demonstration that would probably occupy even
more resources than would a discussion in its justification for its rule.
The bottom line is that if lots of new ideas come forward, the agency
will find that its officials in charge of the rulemaking will have to

63. Interview with Mark Cooper, Director of Research, Consumer Fed’n of America, in
Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2005); Interview with Michael Weisman, Co-Director, Reclaim the
Media, in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2005).
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devote substantially more energy to responding to the ideas it has
64
rejected.
But maybe that is a good thing. The previous paragraphs focus
on the costs to the agency, but maybe those costs are benefits to the
general public. After all, perhaps the new input will persuade the
agency (as the previous section discussed), or should have persuaded
it (in which case judicial invalidation of the rule would be welcome).
More generally, maybe policymakers should embrace the changes
that e-rulemaking would bring about, despite the costs.
III. EVALUATING THESE POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS
The modest literature on e-rulemaking has devoted most of its
energy to the two issues discussed above—how might interactive use
of the Internet be integrated into the rulemaking process, and what
changes would adoption of these proposals likely produce—while
devoting considerably less energy to the more fundamental question
of whether the benefits of those changes outweigh the costs.65 How
should one evaluate the desirability of implementing these proposals?
I now turn to this latter, crucial question.
A. If Additional Participation Does Not Result in Changes to the
Agency’s Decision
If the additional input enabled by the e-rulemaking initiatives
would not change the substantive decisions that agencies make,
should policymakers nonetheless embrace those initiatives? At first
blush, the answer would be no: As I noted in Part II.B, combing
through additional messages imposes some costs, and by hypothesis
the messages would have no effect on the agency’s actions.

64. It is possible that courts (or Congress) will react to agencies’ difficulties in responding
to all the new arguments in comments by relaxing the requirements of hard look review. That is,
judges or legislators might find that a massive increase in the number of arguments to which an
agency must respond imposes significantly higher costs without corresponding benefits, and thus
relax the requirement that agencies in fact take a hard look at all significant arguments against
their regulation. If so, then e-rulemaking will have had a profound effect on the review of
agency rulemakings. The desirability of such a change (which is, of course, purely speculative) is
beyond the scope of this paper.
65. Professor Coglianese is an exception, but even he discusses only briefly the question of
the desirability of increasing public participation. Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation,
supra note 1, at 55–57.
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This calculus does not take into account the potential benefits to
participants from their participation. Some commentators have
suggested that face-to-face deliberation has benefits for participants
that might also apply to e-rulemaking—making participants feel that
their views have been heard, helping them to understand others’
positions and perhaps changing their own views (or changing the
views of others), and, maybe most important, making them into more
engaged citizens.66 On this last point, theorists have for years decried
Americans’ relative lack of involvement in policy debates. Erulemaking could change this as to specific rulemakings:
communications to an agency on a particular issue are one form of
citizen engagement. But e-rulemaking also could work on a larger
level. One goal of e-rulemaking proponents (and advocates of greater
deliberation more generally) is to energize citizens into becoming
involved in debates beyond those at issue in a given rulemaking—to
become active, engaged citizens more generally. This would be
valuable not only to those particular citizens but also to society as a
whole: this greater involvement would be a public good.
Recall, though, that I am positing that the public’s participation
has no impact on an agency’s decision. It is, of course, possible that
the individuals who participate will gain pleasure from their
participation, even if it makes no difference to the outcome. But it
seems at least as likely that (as I noted in Part II.B), once they realize
their comments are not having any impact, they will become
frustrated. More specifically, whatever benefits they receive from
feeling that their views have been heard will be mitigated by their
awareness that the hearing of their views did not translate into any
change in the agency’s position. By contrast, the possibilities of
individuals understanding others’ views, and changing their own
minds or others’, exist independently of the impact of citizens’
communications on an agency. As long as individuals have a
meaningful back-and-forth among themselves, such understanding
and persuasion is possible. But this means that the likelihood of this
understanding and persuasion depends on the degree to which the erulemaking initiatives allow for meaningful interchanges among

66. See id. at 39–40 (noting that “public participation can be viewed as intrinsically valuable
for citizens themselves, for such participation fosters important personal virtues”); Stuart W.
Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public Participation Research Agenda for the Social
Sciences, 21 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 162, 167–73 (2003) (proposing that electronic rulemaking
may foster a more discursive democracy through greater public participation in the process).
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participants and the degree to which people use them. I will discuss
the former in the next section, so I set that aside here. As to the
degree to which people would use such interactive e-rulemaking
tools, that would likely depend in significant part on whether
participants became frustrated once they realized that agencies were
not responding to their input. This point also applies to the last, and
biggest, benefit to individuals and society from individuals’
participation (i.e., producing engaged citizens). If participants are
demoralized rather than energized, then the optimistic vision of an
engaged citizenry will not materialize. My own guess is that there
might be a short-term increase in engagement (and benefits to
society, in the form of energized citizens and understanding and
persuasion of others), but that this increase would dissipate after the
ineffectuality of the individuals’ attempts to persuade the agency
became apparent.
It is interesting to contrast e-rulemaking with negotiated
rulemaking. In negotiated rulemaking, agencies begin a rulemaking
by establishing a committee comprising representatives from
regulated firms, trade associations, citizen groups, and other affected
organizations, as well as members of the agency staff. The idea is that,
with the stakeholders meeting together around a table, they might be
able to reach a consensus, resulting in a rulemaking process that
would be much speedier and much less likely to produce litigation
(because the stakeholders would have already agreed to the rule).
Negotiated rulemaking turned out not to produce those results,
and more generally not to be as successful as its advocates had hoped.
Rules generated through negotiated rulemaking take just as long to
promulgate as rules generated without it, and are no less likely to be
litigated.67 There was a small study (comparing the reactions of

67. See Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes
to Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 187, 204 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (“Our
research demonstrates . . . that rules to which regulatory negotiation was applied took longer to
issue than those developed through conventional proceedings, despite the fact that agencies
were more likely to conduct regulatory negotiations in situations that were amenable to
relatively rapid resolution. In general, we find no evidence that consensual rule making reduces
the time it takes to develop rules.”); Coglianese, supra note 53, at 1335 (“Negotiated rulemaking
does not appear any more capable of limiting regulatory time or avoiding litigation than do the
rulemaking procedures ordinarily used by agencies. The agency that has used negotiated
rulemaking the most, the EPA, has not seen its negotiated rules emerge in final form any sooner
than rules not subject to formal negotiation. Once promulgated, negotiated rules still find
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participants in six conventional rulemakings with participants in eight
negotiated rulemakings) that found that participants in the negotiated
rulemakings had higher levels of satisfaction with the process, found
the process more instructive, and believed that they had generated
68
better quality rules. The significance of this study was mitigated by
its small scale and some significant methodological questions about it,
69
but it does suggest some benefits to negotiated rulemaking. In any
event, many commentators have concluded that the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking do not outweigh the costs (given that
negotiated rulemaking does not speed up rulemakings or reduce the
likelihood of litigation).70
Here, by hypothesis, e-rulemaking does not generate better
71
rules—or even change the rules. It thus seems quite unlikely that e-

themselves subject to legal challenge. The litigation rate for negotiated rules issued by the EPA
has actually been higher than that for other significant EPA rules.”).
68. Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation versus Conventional
Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 599, 625 (2000).
69. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to
Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 431 (2001):
Langbein and Kerwin report that of all the types of participants in negotiated
rulemakings, the representatives from EPA and state government gave negotiated
rulemaking the highest overall ratings. This is important to recognize because
approximately eleven percent of the negotiated rulemaking participants they
interviewed were EPA officials and approximately twenty-five percent were
representatives from state and local government. In contrast, the sample of
individuals who filed comments in conventional rulemakings obviously included no
one from EPA and included only three representatives from state and local
government. Thus, approximately thirty-six percent of the respondents from
negotiated rulemakings were individuals who might be considered ‘enthusiasts,’ given
their higher overall ratings, while only approximately six percent of the comparison
group were.
Id.
70. See Coglianese, supra note 53, at 1261 (“Despite all the postulations about how
negotiated rulemaking will save time and eliminate litigation, the procedure so far has not
proven itself superior to the informal rulemaking that agencies ordinarily use.”); Funk, supra
note 48, at 96–97 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking undermines the principles and values of
administrative rulemaking by changing an agency’s objective from serving the public interest to
seeking consensus among private parties); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits
on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 513 (2000)
(arguing that collaborative regulation cannot help to solve existing regulatory shortcomings
because “they can succeed in overcoming the adversarial propensities of at least some
stakeholders only within narrow regulatory environments”).
71. It also bears noting that with e-rulemaking the new participants do not meet face to
face with each other. The point of e-rulemaking is to allow people to communicate through the
Internet, rather than face to face. Although this may have many advantages, it obviously does
not include the experience of physically meeting together as a community and reaching
conclusions around a table.
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rulemaking would generate even the modest benefits associated with
negotiated rulemaking (absent an effect on the agency’s rules). This is
not to say that participation for the sake of participation has no value.
Rather, its value is likely to be low over time—especially once
participants realize that their participation is not making a
difference.72
And, as I have discussed, the costs for the agency are likely to be
considerable. The bottom line is that, unless an agency’s position
changes as a result of e-rulemaking, it seems hard to justify.
B. If Additional Input Does Affect the Agency’s Decision
Let’s now consider the possibility that the additional input does
affect the agency’s action. This is the scenario that advocates of erulemaking hope for—individuals participate in the rulemaking
process more significantly than they have in the past, and this
additional involvement influences the substance of agency
regulations. The advocates often assume that such public influence
would be beneficial, but that is far from clear. More important, it
implicates one of the central debates in administrative law: should
agencies be influenced by, or insulated from, input from the public?
Many key figures in administrative law have argued that agencies
should not respond to outside forces but should be guided instead
solely by their expertise and independent judgment. They contend
that the questions before the agencies should, and do, turn on
technical expertise, not political considerations. In their view,
influence by individuals is to be avoided, not encouraged.73 Others
take a quite different view, arguing that agencies should respond to
concerns from the public, and should not try to reach their own

72. See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103, 121 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986)
(describing the benefits of participation as the mere by-product, not the main goal, of political
activity).
73. Perhaps the most famous exponent of this view was James Landis, who was the
architect of the new administrative agencies created under Franklin D. Roosevelt. See RITCHIE,
supra note 39, at 1–5 (introducing Landis’s philosophies); see also Gail L. Achterman & Sally K.
Fairfax, Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 508 (1979) (“Public involvement programs . . . may easily mobilize dissent
and heighten polarization, public frustration, and dissatisfaction.”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 173, 178 (1997) (“A threshold amount of participation is necessary to deliberative
decisions, but at some point participation creates significant institutional costs for deliberative
administrative process.”).
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74
expert judgments in a vacuum. Thus the possibility that agency
heads will receive valuable guidance from public-spirited citizens is
matched against the possibility that those agency heads will receive
biased or ill-conceived guidance from players who are motivated by a
self-interest that is not in the public interest (e.g., special interest
groups) or who are woefully ill-informed (e.g., citizens who are
responding to scare tactics). Adding hundreds of thousands of new
citizen participants to the rulemaking process would be particularly
troubling to those who believe that citizens’ input would be
misguided: they would fear that agencies would indeed respond to
these new participants. Such participation may correlate to political
mobilization, so an agency might bend to the participants’ wishes
even if it did not believe that they represented the median American,
as long as the agency believed that they represented a politically
potent force.
This description of the dichotomy is of course vastly
oversimplified. There are many permutations in the setup of this
debate—public choice theorists would suggest that everyone acts, to
at least some degree, in her private interest, so that there is no truly
“public-spirited” input, civic republican theorists would have a more
sanguine view of the input of individuals, etc. Accordingly, the debate
has taken many different forms over the years.75 Does it play out
differently in the e-rulemaking context? Perhaps.
As I noted in Part I, some of the proposals for e-rulemaking
would allow for collaboration and/or for individuals rating others’
contributions. Working models of such enterprises include, most
notably, Wikipedia and Slashdot.
The idea behind Wikipedia is fairly straightforward: two heads
are better than one, and one million heads are far better than one.
The editors of Wikipedia do not claim that each addition will be an
improvement, but they do claim that the movement will be toward a
better product. New people will help to refine what is written, so
continued adding/editing will improve it.

74. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE
L.J. 359, 380–81, 403 (1972) (arguing for the virtues of public participation in agency
decisionmaking); Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 540 (1970) (contending
that the interested public should participate in the rulemaking process).
75. For a good summary, see generally Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of
Direct Citizen Participation, 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315, 315 (2004) (chronicling the history
of and debate over direct citizen participation).
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There is some dispute about the reliability of Wikipedia entries
in comparison to conventional encyclopedias. Wiki skeptics suggest
that adding people will lead not to continual improvement, but
instead to regression to the mean. Robert McHenry, a former editor
in chief of the Encyclopedia Britannica (and thus not a neutral
observer) wrote a criticism of Wikipedia making exactly this
argument. He focused on an entry on a subject about which he knew
quite a bit (Alexander Hamilton) and found not only that it was
riddled with errors and bad prose but also that the entry became
76
worse as more people contributed to it. In his words, “the earlier
versions of the article are better written overall, with fewer murky
passages and sophomoric summaries. Contrary to the faith, the article
77
has, in fact, been edited into mediocrity.” The journal Nature,
however, undertook a more systematic study entailing peer review of
forty-two scientific entries in Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia
Britannica.78 It found that Wikipedia’s entries had more errors, but
“the difference in accuracy was not particularly great: the average
science entry in Wikipedia contained around four inaccuracies;
Britannica, about three.”79
There are, however, two reasons why the relatively positive
experience underlying the Nature study would not extend to
collaborative commenting on agency rulemaking. First, Wikipedia has
a fairly sophisticated set of rules to deal with people whose
contributions do more harm than good. Wikipedia’s founders
recognized the danger posed by “cranks,” “trolls and flamers,”
80
“partisans,” et cetera, and they created several mechanisms for
76. What actually happened in the case of the Alexander Hamilton entry is that, after the
McHenry article appeared, a Wiki community member posted that entry on a webpage devoted
to entries that needed to be improved/updated, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Peer_
review, and soon most of the errors and clumsiness that McHenry identified were removed.
77. Robert McHenry, The Faith-Based Encyclopedia, TCSDAILY, Nov. 15, 2004,
http://www.techcentralstation.com/111504A.html; see also Can you trust Wikipedia?, THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/
0,,1599116,00.html (compiling critiques of various Wikipedia entries).
78. Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, NATURE (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.nature.com/news/2005/051212/full/438900a.html (reporting on the Nature
investigation that compares Wikipedia and Britannica).
79. Id.
80. Indeed, one of Wikipedia’s founders left the project and identified “the dominance of
difficult people, trolls, and their enablers” as a major problem for Wikipedia. Larry Sanger, Why
Wikipedia Must Jettison Its Anti-Elitism, Dec. 31, 2004, available at http://www.kuro5hin.org/
story/2004/12/30/142458/25; see also Stacy Schiff, Know it All: Can Wikipedia Conquer
Expertise?, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2006, at 36 (“Even Eric Raymond, the open-source pioneer
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81
policing the site to eliminate “patent nonsense.” Most notably, other
users can edit such nonsense or, if they deem the entire entry to be
nonsense, can list it on a page devoted to nominations for deleting
82
entries. If the user is more confident of an entry’s worthlessness, she
can make it a “candidate for speedy deletion.”83 Beyond that, there
are a few hundred “administrators” of Wikipedia, each of whom has
84
the authority to delete any page. There is even a dispute resolution
85
process. And in 2005 (in response to a notorious episode in which an
anonymously created Wikipedia entry falsely suggested that John
Seigenthaler Sr. may have been involved in the Kennedy
assassinations), the founder of Wikipedia announced that Wikipedia
would stop accepting new pages from anonymous creators.86
Creating a mechanism for crafting communications to agencies
on the Wikipedia model would thus entail a substantial investment of
time and energy for whichever private entity chose to do it—and it
would have to be a private entity, as it is hard to imagine a
government entity playing the editing role described above.87 It is

whose work inspired [Wikipedia head] Wales, argues that ‘“disaster” is not too strong a word’
for Wikipedia. In his view, the site is ‘infested with moonbats.’”).
81. Wikipedia: Patent Nonsense, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Patent_nonsense
(last visited May 4, 2006); see also Wikipedia: Replies to Common Objections,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Replies_to_common_objections (last visited May 4,
2006) (noting ways to combat unhelpful contributions).
82. Wikipedia: Articles for Deletion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Votes_for_
deletion (last visited May 4, 2006).
83. Wikipedia: Criteria for Speedy Deletion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Candidates_for_speedy_deletion (last visited May 4, 2006).
84. Wikipedia: List of Administrators, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_
administrators (last visited May 4, 2006).
85. Wikipedia: Resolving Disputes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_
resolution (last visited May 4, 2006). For a fuller discussion of the Wikipedia dispute resolution
process, see Joseph M. Reagle, Jr., A Case of Mutual Aid: Wikipedia, Politeness, and Perspective
Taking, http://reagle.org/joseph/2004/agree/wikip-agree.html.
86. See Jimmy Wales, Experiment on new pages [E-mail to Wiki English listserv], available
at http://mail.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2005-December/033880.html (“Today, as an
experiment, we will be turning off new pages creation for anonymous users in the English
Wikipedia.”); Article Creation Restricted to Logged-In Editors, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Wikipedia_Signpost/2005-12-05/Page_creation_restrictions (discussing this policy);
see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Rewriting History; Snared in the Web of a Wikipedia Liar, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at 1 (“Mr. Seigenthaler recently read about himself on Wikipedia and
was shocked to learn that he ‘was thought to have been directly involved in the Kennedy
assassinations of both John and his brother Bobby.’”).
87. The political costs associated with a government agency publicly identifying some
submissions as worthless are so great, and the benefit to the agency of the agency being in
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certainly possible that some person or group of people would go to
the trouble to set up a wiki for communications to an agency, but it is
not at all clear that individuals would come in significant numbers to
such a wiki, as their contributions would be included in the
communication to the agency only if the wiki’s controllers so agreed.
Isn’t the same thing true for Wikipedia? Yes, but this highlights
the second difference between Wikipedia and communications to an
agency: such comments will heavily involve policy preferences, and
thus the chances for disagreement are very high. One aspect of the
Wikipedia model is that its entries are compilations of facts. And
insofar as there are disputes about facts (e.g., whether surface
temperatures on earth have risen over the last one hundred years),
then the Wikipedia entry can compile the points made by either side.
Communications to agencies involve facts, too, but policy
considerations are almost always central. If, say, the EPA were to
reconsider whether it should create a cap-and-trade system for
emissions of carbon dioxide, various facts (including the rise in
surface temperatures over the last one hundred years) would be
88
relevant, but so, too, would fundamental policy choices. If two
participants have opposite views on the propriety of the government’s
regulating emissions of any pollutant, it is hard to see how a wiki
would mediate their dispute. One will be heard and the other
excluded (by an editor accepting one and not the other, or, if there is
no editor, by whoever modifies the page last putting in her views); or
both will be heard, in which case the resulting communication will be
schizophrenic.
This has, indeed, occurred on Wikipedia itself with respect to
certain entries that reflected larger political positions. One notorious
example occurred in the run-up to the November 2004 presidential
election. People started vandalizing the pages of George Bush and
John Kerry, and as soon as one person fixed a page it was vandalized
again. In light of the problems, an administrator took the

charge (as opposed to a private entity) sufficiently small, that the chances of a government
agency taking on this responsibility seem slim.
88. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1282 (2004) (“In setting [air quality standards],
or any other regulatory standard, EPA officials need to draw upon the available scientific
evidence on the health effects of different pollutants, but ultimately they must make a decision
based on factors other than just the science. Standing alone, scientific data on ozone and
particulate matter do not, and cannot, provide a principled justification for the level at which
the respective air quality standards are set.”).
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extraordinary (for Wikipedia) step of “freezing” the Bush and Kerry
pages, despite the strongly worded Wikipedia norm against such
89
freezing. But then another administrator, enforcing the norm against
freezing, unfroze the pages, only to have them vandalized again. The
pages were then frozen and unfrozen, back and forth, several more
times.90
I have been discussing a model that contains editors. What about
collaboration with no editors or controllers? The answer would likely
not be satisfactory. There is every reason to expect a continual backand-forth of deletions and reinsertions between those with competing
views—like the battle over the Bush and Kerry pages, without the
periods of freezing. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect that some
partisan (and there need be only one) would program her computer
(as for Ebay auctions) to wait until the last moment before the
communication was finalized, and then to replace the entire
communication with one to her liking in the millisecond before such
finalization. And, the inserted material might not even be responsive.
That is what happened to the Los Angeles Times website when it
experimented with a collaborative editorial: users repeatedly added
pornography to the editorial, such that the editors finally decided to
end the experiment prematurely.91
Would it make sense to go further, with a regulation itself (as
opposed to comments about a regulation) created by peer production,
or a regulation as a wiki? No. The beauty of processes such as open
source, peer production, and wikis is that they are ultimately
producing a product that individuals can take or leave as they see fit.
In contrast to the commercial context of peer production, a rule is not
merely one of many products among which users can choose; it is
imposed on all regulated parties. In the commercial context, a
misbegotten project simply fails to gain adherents and is quickly
89. See Wikipedia: Replies to Common Objections, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Replies_to_common_objections (last visited May 4, 2006) (“As a community, almost all of us
are opposed to what has been called the policy of completely ‘freezing’ particular pages . . . .”).
90. See Sarah Boxer, Mudslinging Weasels into Online History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004,
at E1 (describing the Bush–Kerry incidents on Wikipedia, and noting that, at the times when the
Bush and Kerry pages were frozen, “Senator Kerry and President Bush took their places next to
the other untouchables in the Wikipedia: Ariel Sharon, Osama bin Laden, Rush Limbaugh and
Salvador Allende”).
91. See Los Angeles Times Suspends ‘Wikitorials’: Users Flood Paper’s Web Site with Foul
Language, Pornography, MSNBC, June 21, 2005, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8300420/
(reporting the failure and cessation of the paper’s experiment with allowing readers to re-write
the editorial).
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forgotten. In the regulatory context, a misbegotten project imposes
huge costs, precisely because it actually governs. Second, and
relatedly, in the peer production context the goal is “rough
consensus”—substantial agreement among the relevant players, but
not universal agreement. And usually no single person or small group
of people must be in the majority; if the overwhelming majority
agrees on something but there are a few holdouts, the norm is that the
agreement prevails, regardless of who the holdouts are. But that
system presumes an absence of hierarchy, and in agencies there is a
clear hierarchy: outsiders can come to whatever agreement they want,
but the ultimate judgment is up to the agency head. The peer
production model embodies a structure of rough consensus that
presumes a particular arrangement—in which the agency head would
go along with whatever “rough consensus” emerged—that would
represent a significant shift in agency operations. Such a shift is
possible, of course, but the argument for it needs to be made. Note
that this was one of the objections to negotiated rulemaking; having
people sitting around a table negotiating reduced the agency head to
just another interested party.92
If Wikipedia is not an attractive model for citizens’
communications to agencies, one obvious change would be to keep
every person’s contribution intact, rather than let someone else edit
or delete it. There could still be an element of collaboration if, say,
people could rate, and respond to, others’ contributions. The model
here is Slashdot and its Slash software. As I noted in Part I, anyone
can submit a story, but editors filter out those they deem unhelpful.
That filtering aspect is similar to the Wikipedia model and has its
attendant advantages and disadvantages: it allows for greater focus,
but at a cost of deleting some people’s views. Putting a small group of
editors in charge of filtering everyone’s input would put a huge
amount of pressure on the political ideology of those editors, with the
attendant likelihood that they would filter out messages with which
they disagreed. In addition, eliminating some voices is at crosspurposes with the ideal of allowing open communication to agencies.

92. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 48, at 92 (“The concept of regulatory negotiation . . .
[reduces] the agency to the level of a mere participant in the formulation of the rule, and . . .
essentially [denies] that the agency has any responsibility beyond giving effect to the consensus
achieved by the group.”); Patricia Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for
the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1985) (warning that negotiated rulemakings could
produce agreements that amount to “pure political logrolling” among the negotiating parties).
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The stakes, and propriety, of deleting comments are different for a
website devoted to providing relevant news than for one devoted to
presenting the views of concerned citizens.
But recall that on Slashdot, once stories make it through the
opening filter, users submit comments, rate other people’s comments,
and (when acting as “moderators,” or meta-raters) rate other people’s
ratings. Might such a reputation-based system, without the additional
element of exclusion of inputs that editors’ found unhelpful, be a
good model for communications to agencies? It is possible. The
Slashdot model seems more attractive than the wiki model. It would
allow for everyone to add input, but each added comment would have
a rating that an agency could use (as users of Slashdot regularly do) as
a signal of value. So the agency could see, at a glance, which
comments were deemed by other users to be of high quality, and
which were not. This would avoid the disadvantages of deleting
comments while still allowing for quality judgments by other users. If
these quality judgments could be trusted, they could help agencies
and courts determine which comments contained valuable input.
But could they be trusted? There would still be the danger of
quality judgments being centrally based on policy preferences. Asking
people to make quality judgments about a news item is quite different
from asking them to make such judgments about the desirability of
environmental regulation. Indeed, as with Wikipedia, Slashdot may
work because the stakes are relatively low: all that is at issue is the
rating of an article. When it comes to commenting on important
public disputes, users may find that their political preferences trump
other considerations.
There may be ways to mitigate the problems created by strongly
held political views trumping other aspects of judgment. First, it may
be that people recognize strong points and identify them as such even
when they disagree. Second, and perhaps more realistically, a large
number of negative ratings need not overwhelm the information
conveyed by a large number of strongly positive ratings. Among the
many points and arguments that might be put forward in favor of a
given regulatory position, advocates of that position would have an
interest in supporting the ones they deemed strongest. So if, among
fifty different communications in favor of a particular policy position,
one had a large number of very high ratings and a large number of
very low ratings, whereas all the other communications had few high
ratings (and whatever number of low ratings), the agency might
conclude that the one with the most high ratings was deemed to be
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the best point by the advocates of that view. Whether this metric
would work would depend on the degree to which opponents of that
position would intentionally confuse the system by giving a high
rating to an argument that they deemed weak (a risky strategy, given
that the agency might treat that high rating as support for the policy
position more generally), and the degree to which such bad-faith
commenters could be identified (e.g., if the agency could see that they
were simultaneously giving high ratings to diametrically opposed
policy positions).
For better or worse, such poll skewing—in which people
intentionally support voting positions (usually, candidates) whom
they dislike in order to produce a weak opponent—is frequently
alleged (it is of course hard to prove). Indeed, this was a stated fear of
political parties that opposed open voting regimes under which those
not registered in the party could vote in the party’s primaries; they
feared that people hostile to the party’s agenda would vote for a weak
candidate to hurt the party and help their own candidate of another
party.93 One problem for those attempting poll skewing in the voting
booth is that they fail to use their one vote to support their own
candidate. In the virtual context, by contrast, an individual could try
to have it both ways, by supporting both the arguments she liked and
the ones of her opponents that she deemed weakest. Agencies could
try to prevent such behavior by checking a given person’s ratings for
consistency, but that entails significant costs and can be circumscribed
by the person’s adopting more than one online identity. Agencies
could try to avoid this last problem by allowing each person to have
only one online identity, but that entails very great costs. It would be
a massive undertaking to ensure that each online identity corresponds
(a) to a real person who (b) actually signed up herself—as opposed to
having her relative or friend sign up in her name, knowing that she
would never bother to do so.
In short, the familiar debates about the desirability of outside
forces affecting agency decisions may have a somewhat different cast
in the e-rulemaking context. The difficulty is that one cannot know
whether it will in fact do so. More to the point, one cannot determine,
a priori, whether the impact will be desirable.

93. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577–82 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional a statute restricting political parties’ protected freedom to select nominees).
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C. What Do the Results So Far Reveal?
Commentators are not entirely in the world of speculation—
there are some data on the implementation of e-rulemaking thus far.
What do they tell us? Professor Coglianese’s contribution to this
symposium covers much of what I address in this Section,94 so my
discussion will be relatively brief.
In the pre–e-rulemaking era, pending rulemakings attracted
relatively few comments from individuals; the main participants were
95
major stakeholders. Has the advent of the Web and e-mail
commenting brought about changes? Discouragingly, the answer is
no. As to quantity, the empirical data suggest that the advent of the
Web and e-mail commenting has not produced an increase in the
number of comments.96 More robust data suggest that the
introduction of e-mail comments has not increased comments for the
overwhelming majority of rulemakings. That is, if the Internet has
had any effect on the quantity of public communications with
agencies, that effect is confined to a very small number of unusually
salient rulemakings—ones for which interested groups mount huge
public relations efforts (combined with form e-mails for people to
send). If there is any increase in comments, in other words, it would
appear to be attributable to the ease of sending form comments in
response to publicity campaigns.97
This is not entirely surprising. In other contexts, reducing costs
has not led to an explosion of citizen participation. For instance,
barriers to voting have been reduced in the last half century, and yet
the percentage of the voting-age population that actually votes has
declined during that time. And even experts in the rulemaking

94. See generally Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006).
95. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 191–210 (1994); Coglianese, supra note 94, at 949–52.
96. See Steven J. Balla & Benjamin Daniels, Information Technology and Public
Commenting on Agency Regulations (2005)(Midwest Political Science Association); see also
Coglianese, supra note 94, at 954–55.
97. See John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal
Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 988 (2006) (noting that a “spike in comments
should not necessarily be interpreted as demonstrating heightened interest from individuals”).
But see Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing a relative
dearth of comments submitted through Regulations.gov in spite of its publicity).
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process (for whom the costs of participation are presumably lower)
98
often do not file comments.
If the Internet has had little or no impact on the quantity of
public participation, what about the quality of such participation?
Again, the results are discouraging. The studies thus far find that the
individual comments do not put forward new data or arguments.
Individuals have overwhelmingly sent form letters, or form letters
with an additional sentence or two that adds no new rationales, data,
99
or arguments that the agency would not have already received. Are
the participants who submit electronic comments engaging in greater
deliberative activity? Again, the answer so far is no. An empirical
study found that “electronic commenters do not appear to be any
more deliberatively engaged than paper commenters.”100 The
evidence so far indicates that the additional individual involvement
enabled by e-rulemaking has neither produced different regulatory
outcomes nor produced the degree of engagement among the
citizenry that some have expected.101
98. Professor Peter Strauss surveyed the members of the American Bar Association’s
Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice in 2003. Strauss, supra note 32, at 8,
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers_reports/Strauss_
Erulemaking_Survey.pdf. He discovered that many of the 320 respondents said that they looked
at websites for research purposes (often agency websites), but that only 45 percent had filed
comments in any rulemaking proceedings in the previous three years. Id. As Professor
Coglianese noted, “[i]f the majority of the most relevant legal specialists do not file comments in
rulemakings, we probably should not expect to see a large proportion of ordinary citizens filing
comments, even with a more digitized and accessible rulemaking process.” Coglianese, Internet
and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 54.
99. See de Figueiredo, supra note 97, at 990 (deflating the relative significance of volume
spikes in public e-comments between 1998 and 2004); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation?
Mass e-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 5 (Jan. 2, 2006), available at
http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu/doc/papers/Whither Deliberation.pdf (“To date, there is very
little evidence that the actual public comment text submitted meets any of our deliberative
thresholds.”).
100. David Schlosberg et al., ‘To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is the
(Real) Question’: Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 15 (May
5, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
101. Shulman, supra note 99, at 14–15. Shulman examined a sample of e-mails sent to
agencies as part of a campaign by environmental groups to get citizens involved in the
rulemaking process via the Internet. He concluded that:
At this early stage in the research (and in the epoch of mass e-mail campaigns) there
are few indications that online deliberation is enhanced within the current
eGovernment configuration in the United States. The mass e-mail campaign in
particular appears to be an odd and possibly counter-productive tribute to twentieth
century notions of one-directional, non-deliberative, un-reflexive nose counting.
Although the medium could be used to promote better dialogue, debate and
deliberation, and public understanding, it falls short of the loftier ideals held out by
hopeful political theorists.
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Indeed, perhaps the most obvious result of the implementation
of e-rulemaking is the rise of campaigns using form e-mails aimed at
agencies, and the concomitant rise in consulting groups that help to
102
organize those campaigns. Interest groups have done a good job of
presenting alarming (often misleading) statistics on their websites as a
means of pushing people to submit e-mail comments to agencies.103
This has often proved to be an effective organizing tool, but it does
104
not appear to convey useful information to the agency.
D. The Case for Modest, Skeptical Experimentation
The analysis could stop here. That is, policymakers could decide
that they have enough information to determine that e-rulemaking
simply will not have a positive impact that will justify the costs of its
implementation (and maybe not have any positive impact at all). That
would be a reasonable conclusion, given the disappointing results so
Id. at 14–15; see also Dietram A. Scheufele & Matthew C. Nisbet, Being a Citizen Online: New
Opportunities and Dead Ends, PRESS/POLITICS, July 1, 2002, at 55, 69 (presenting empirical
findings and concluding that “the role of the Internet in promoting active and informed
citizenship is minimal”); Darrell M. West, E-Government and the Transformation of Service
Delivery and Citizen Attitudes, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 15, 15–16 (2004) (finding that egovernment has failed to transform service delivery or public trust in government); Sylvia Tesh,
The Internet and the Grass Roots, 15 ORG. & ENV’T 336, 336 (2002) (arguing that the Internet is
merely another tool in the narrow range of citizen options in policy-making participation, and
that it moreover robs grassroots movements of the motivational power of physical public
hearings).
102. E.g., Capitol Advantage Home Page, http://www.capitoladvantage.com (last visited
July 10, 2006); GetActive Home Page, http://www.getactive.com (last visited July 10, 2006);
Kintera Advocacy Product Page, http://www.ctsg.com (last visited July 10, 2006).
According to two consultants to agencies, this is part of a larger problem:
The Internet as a means for expanded public participation in rulemaking has inspired
a sort of rulemaking arms race. Some commenter organizations are investing
excessive time and money in technology that will enable them and their members to
produce large numbers of comments as quickly as possible in response to any
rulemaking. Some commenter organizations are convinced that their position is
strengthened by taking ten salient points and masquerading them as thousands of
unique thoughts from thousands of thoughtful taxpayers.
Under the current e-rulemaking plan, interest groups spend money on the latest
software to generate thousands of e-comments, and agencies are forced to invest in
sophisticated software that will enable them to mine the thousands of comments to
identify the ten salient points. This is a silly, wasteful, and circular game the
rulemaking world has engaged in.
Emery & Emery, supra note 26, at 8.
103. E.g., http://www.cleartheair.org/mercury (presenting concerns about mercury and then
providing a link along with the statements “Take Action by telling the EPA to strengthen the
mercury rule. Click to send a comment to the EPA docket.”); see supra note 30.
104. For a discussion of the insignificance of e-mail quantity as an indicator, see supra notes
29–43 and accompanying text.
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far, but on balance it would be a mistake. Further experimentation
with e-rulemaking both might uncover forms of e-rulemaking that are
worth the costs and might give policymakers valuable information
about the rulemaking process. I believe that neither of these potential
benefits on its own would justify further development of erulemaking initiatives, but that the combination of the two justifies a
modest level of experimentation with new e-rulemaking initiatives.
The possibility that some forms of e-rulemaking will have
benefits that outweigh the costs is fairly straightforward in light of the
previous discussion. Although the data on e-rulemaking are
discouraging, they are also incomplete. Our experience with the
current experiments is fairly brief, and broader changes (such as wikis
and reputation-based systems) have not been attempted. Insofar as
comments from individuals have added little to what agencies already
received from existing commenters, it could be that individuals simply
will not add much; but it also could be (as some e-rulemaking
proponents contend) that merely allowing citizens to e-mail agencies
changes fairly little, whereas creating opportunities for meaningful
collaboration with or rating by individuals will present points and
data that agencies would not otherwise receive. Similarly, the fact that
input thus far seems not to have changed agencies’ rulemakings could
mean that agencies will not be affected by input from individuals; but
it could be that they will be affected if more valuable input comes
from individuals via collaboration or rating. Put differently,
researchers have not run the experiments that would allow them to
determine whether the patterns in the offline world (where individual
comments have little impact) would apply if the broader erulemaking proposals were fully implemented for at least some
rulemakings. The existing data are too limited to give much guidance
on these issues.
The second potential benefit is less obvious: e-rulemaking
initiatives may give policymakers valuable information about the
rulemaking process. E-rulemaking is not specifically aimed at
increasing transparency and creating more data for researchers. The
stated motivation behind e-rulemaking is to confer the benefits
discussed in this Article. But the effect of e-rulemaking may be to
enhance researchers’ and policymakers’ understanding of the
rulemaking process. Such a greater understanding does not depend
on e-rulemaking producing the benefits that its proponents have put
forward. It may be that full implementation of e-rulemaking
initiatives does not produce more citizen involvement, better input
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from citizens, or changes in agency behavior, but that it nonetheless
sheds light on how agencies operate by giving researchers additional
tools to track how materials are presented to agencies and how those
agencies choose to respond (or not to respond) to them. If, for
example, e-rulemaking increases the quantity and quality of citizen
participation in the commenting process, but these increases have no
impact on agencies’ behavior, that fact will suggest that agencies’
decisions are not affected by those comments and instead are
influenced by other inputs. This result would be disappointing to erulemaking proponents, but it might be useful for those trying to
understand how agencies work—and in particular the degree to which
they are captured by powerful entities. It is not clear that such
information would make experimenting with additional e-rulemaking
initiatives worth the cost, but adding the value of the information
created by the agencies’ non-responsiveness makes it a closer
question. By contrast, if new e-rulemaking initiatives did not increase
the quantity or quality of citizen participation, then the goals of the erulemaking proponents would not be advanced and researchers
would learn nothing new about agencies. All they would learn is that
people believe they have better things to do with their time than
comment to agencies, even when such commenting is interactive—
information that would not seem to be worth the cost of creating new
e-rulemaking initiatives. The outcome that would most likely produce
benefits greater than the costs would arise if it appeared that the
additional participation resulting from new e-rulemaking initiatives
did have a positive impact on the agency. In those circumstances, erulemaking would thus not only change agency behavior for the
better but also provide valuable evidence about agency
decisionmaking.
Experimentation will not provide definitive answers. Any given
agency action will always have its own idiosyncrasies, and the metrics
for determining the quality of public participation and the impact of
that participation on agencies will always be imperfect. After all,
researchers can create clear, objective metrics (e.g., number of
comments submitted to an agency by members of the public) that
may not have any correlation to an agreed-upon definition of quality.
Meanwhile, they can instead use qualitative measurements, but of
course those are contestable. They could, for example, look to see
whether public participation added valuable ideas, but that would
require deciding which ideas really are valuable. But researchers
could gain data that, in combination with possibly contestable
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judgments and assumptions about causal mechanisms, should provide
some useful information. If, for example, wider public participation
produced a point or argument that did not appear elsewhere and was
not obvious, and that point or argument ended up in the agency’s
regulation, one might surmise that there was a reasonable chance that
the public participation had influenced the agency’s decision.
Policymakers could then draw conclusions about the value of that
influence, depending of course on contestable judgments of value.
There are lots of ways that agencies can tweak their procedures
to increase transparency and provide additional data. They do not
need to implement e-rulemaking to gain that information. So if the
goal is more information about how agencies operate, why not pursue
that goal directly and jettison the e-rulemaking proposals (unless they
happened to be the best way to produce additional information about
the rulemaking process)? The answer, as I suggested above, is that
more ambitious e-rulemaking implementation may have the benefits
that their proponents have put forward, and failing to determine
whether those benefits materialize would be a missed opportunity. By
adding a new element of procedures designed to encourage public
participation, policymakers can not only gain information about the
rulemaking process but also more directly evaluate those new
procedures.
I do not believe that this justifies across-the-board adoption of erulemaking proposals. The costs of such implementation are too high,
and the benefits too uncertain. But I believe it does justify
experimentation with such proposals by some agencies, so that
agencies can serve as laboratories of democracy. The classic instance
105
of laboratories of democracy is state experimentation, but agency
experimentation seems at least as attractive. State experimentation
has the advantage of allowing for comparison insofar as states are
similarly situated, but it has the disadvantage of potentially significant
costs for interstate activities: a single company might have to comply
with a dozen different regulatory schemes as its activities cross state
lines. Each agency regulates a different sector of the economy, so that
comparison among agencies is not always easy (although comparison
among states is also not as easy as one might imagine, given the
variability among state regimes). But the advantage of
105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may . . .
serve as a laboratory . . . .”).
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experimentation for agencies is that agencies regulate at the national
level, so experimentation does not increase costs for regulated
parties.
As I noted in Part I, the federal government has moved away
from individual agency experimentation and toward a uniform set of
e-rulemaking protocols.106 Such centralization may have benefits,
particularly insofar as it reduces the costs for individuals to
participate in agency actions.107 But this discussion highlights that it
has significant costs, because it minimizes the divergence among
agencies and thus the possibilities for experimentation. If the choice is
between across-the-board implementation of further e-rulemaking
initiatives or not, this Article suggests the latter choice. But modest
experimentation is the best choice.
CONCLUSION
I have tried in this Article to describe the possible outcomes, and
evaluations, of the implementation of e-rulemaking. The key word is
“possible.” My Article, filled with words like “could” and “might,”
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the effects of e-rulemaking.
This is not an accident. One of my main contentions is that erulemaking could play out in a variety of different ways, and for this
reason it is difficult to be confident in my judgments.
We know something about the costs: implementation of erulemaking proposals will entail nontrivial costs.108 If e-rulemaking
inspires any significant number of citizens to participate, agencies will
have to devote considerable resources to considering this new input.
And if e-rulemaking does not inspire significant new input, then it will
not be terribly costly, but it will also be of little benefit; by hypothesis,
whatever effort agencies will expend in creating e-rulemaking
procedures will inspire a collective yawn. So the costs of
implementation exist, and they should make us wary.
106. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
107. It is not clear that centralization will reduce costs for users. For instance, it may be that
most of those who would want to send communications to the Environmental Protection
Agency or the Federal Communications Commission would find it more convenient to go
directly to the agency’s website and/or would find a commenting system tailored to that agency
more valuable or easy to use. The empirical data on this question are too sparse thus far for
researchers to be able to draw conclusions on this question. The point in text, of course, is that
there are other reasons to be wary of uniform implementation of e-rulemaking initiatives.
108. Or the e-rulemaking proposals will entail small costs but have trivial benefits. See supra
Part II.
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The empirical data so far are discouraging, but we do not know
enough about the benefits of e-rulemaking to rule out the further
implementation of e-rulemaking proposals. Most fundamentally, we
do not know whether the input enabled by e-rulemaking will be
beneficial, we do not know whether the agency will respond to it, or
how courts will respond to the agency’s action, and thus we do not
know whether, in light of the costs and the benefits, it makes sense to
undertake ambitious e-rulemaking initiatives. If I ended the analysis
here, I would end with a position of skepticism but uncertainty: my
assessment is that e-rulemaking likely is not worth the costs, but that
we cannot quantify the possibilities with confidence.
The analysis need not stop there, however. Policymakers can
encourage modest experimentation with new e-rulemaking
procedures, as that will allow them to evaluate such procedures and
gain additional information about the rulemaking process. Our
skepticism about e-rulemaking—informed by the disappointing
empirical data so far—counsels against a massive investment in erulemaking initiatives. But our uncertainty over the possible benefits
of e-rulemaking, combined with the possibility of new data on
rulemaking, counsels in favor additional experimentation.
It bears noting that our uncertainty about the benefits of erulemaking stems in significant part from the fact that rulemaking has
long been an insiders’ game. Public participation has never been
terribly easy or encouraged. A member of the public could file a
formal comment (which is time-consuming) or send a form letter or email (with little reason to believe that it would make a difference),
but she had no easy mechanisms to collaborate with other citizens.
Ignorance about the likely level and quality of public participation
has thus been in part a function of the relative inaccessibility of the
rulemaking process to members of the public. Meanwhile, ignorance
about how agencies decide—and in particular whether they are
influenced by communications that are not generated by interest
groups—flows from a lack of good empirical data about the effect
that such communications actually have on agencies. Both forms of
ignorance could be alleviated by experimentation with e-rulemaking.
Thus the promise of e-rulemaking, in my view, is that it may
produce valuable changes in the rulemaking process, and it may give
us more information about the rulemaking process. Skeptical
experimentation, then, will yield two kinds of data—more
information about the attractiveness of e-rulemaking and more
information about how rulemakings take shape—without imposing

01__BENJAMIN.DOC

2006]

10/4/2006 1:08 PM

EVALUATING E-RULEMAKING

941

the larger costs that full implementation of e-rulemaking would
entail. Even if e-rulemaking initiatives prove to have little impact,
they may thus serve the salutary purpose of providing better
information upon which to base future initiatives to change the
regulatory process.

